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I. INTRODUCTION

Consider the circumstances and estate plans of two decedents,
Testator and Settlor. Testator executes a will that devises her entire
estate. The will does not provide for, or state an intention to disinherit, a
child born after the execution of the will. Testator then has a child, A.
Similarly, Settlor establishes and funds an inter-vivos revocable trust to
dispose of her assets at her death. The trust instrument does not provide
for, or express an intention to disinherit, an afterborn child. Settlor
subsequently has a child, B. Suppose Testator and Settlor both die
shortly thereafter as single Ohio domiciliaries. Testator dies without
revoking her will or executing a new will, and Settlor dies without
having revoked or revised the trust instrument. Will the afterborn
children receive a share of the estate or the trust?
To answer this question, it is necessary to look to what are
commonly referred to as omitted child or pretermitted heir statutes. 1
Such statutes, however, have traditionally applied only to wills, 2 and
neither the General Assembly nor the courts in Ohio have made its
pretermitted heir statute applicable to revocable trusts.3 Thus, under
Ohio’s pretermitted heir statute, because A was omitted from Testator’s
will, A is entitled to an intestate share of the estate. 4 Conversely, because
*J.D. Candidate, The University of Akron School of Law, May 2017. Production Editor, Akron Law
Review, 2016-2017. B.A. in Psychology and Justice Studies, magna cum laude, Kent State
University, 2013. The author would like to thank Professor Alan Newman for his assistance with
this article.
1. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 9.6 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
2. See Alan Newman, Revocable Trusts and the Law of Wills: An Imperfect Fit, 43 REAL
PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 523, 550 (2008).
3. See infra Part II.
4. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.34 (West, Westlaw through File 2 of the 132nd GA (2017-
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B was unintentionally disinherited from a revocable trust instrument, and
although the situations of A and B are very much alike, it is unlikely B
will receive a share of Settlor’s trust assets. That outcome, however, is
not entirely clear, as there is some authority for applying rules under the
law of wills to will substitutes such as revocable trusts even in the
absence of explicit statutory authority for doing so. 5
Generally, pretermitted heir statutes protect a child, and under some
statutes a more remote descendant of the testator from unintentional
disinheritance. 6 Their purpose is to carry out the presumed intent of the
decedent to provide for a child inadvertently omitted from the will. 7
Because revocable trusts are regularly used as substitutes for wills,
primarily to avoid probate administration, 8 presumptions regarding the
intent of a decedent that are applicable to wills should also be applicable
2018)). This is the result because Testator died single. In Ohio, if the testator has a surviving spouse,
the pretermitted heir receives an intestate share of only that portion of the estate which is not left to
the surviving spouse. Id.; see also UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-302 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 194-95
(2013).
5. See generally John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law
of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 (AM. LAW INST. 2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §
25(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 34.2(2)
(AM. LAW INST. 1992).
6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.6 cmt.
d. The disinheritance of a child must be unintentional for the statute to apply. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB.
CODE § 2-302. Under the Uniform Probate Code, the statute does not apply if it appears that the
omission was intentional by the language of the will or if the testator provided for the afterborn
child by nonprobate transfer in lieu of providing for the child in the will. Id. § 2-302(b).
Most omitted child or heir statutes protect only persons born after a testator’s execution of her will,
although some also apply to children or other heirs who were living when the testator executed the
will. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.6(a).
7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.6
cmt. i (Because omitted child statutes only protect persons from unintentional disinheritance, they
yield to a contrary intent.).
8. Today, the widely accepted public conception of probate administration is that it is
costly, time consuming, too complex, and lacks privacy. David Horton, In Partial Defense of
Probate: Evidence from Alameda County, California, 103 GEO. L.J. 605, 639-41 (2015); see also
Karen M. Moore, Current Issues Under the Ohio Trust Code: The Revocable Trust, Chapter 5806,
25 OHIO PROB. L.J. 8 (2015). By the use of will substitutes, individuals are able to avoid these
disadvantages of the probate system. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 7.1-7.2; see also Langbein, supra note 5, at 1108-09. Other common uses
of revocable trusts are to prepare for the settlor’s incapacity, see Nathaniel W. Schwickerath, Note,
Public Policy and the Probate Pariah: Confusion in the Law of Will Substitutes, 48 DRAKE L. REV.
769, 777 (2000) (citing Louis A. Mezzullo et al., Planning for Incapacity, C712 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 319,
333-34 (1991)), and to provide privacy with respect to the disposition of the settlor’s assets, Moore,
supra note 8 (discussing the increase in accessibility to individuals’ information with the use of the
Internet). Revocable trusts can also be easily created and amended. Id.; see also Langbein, supra
note 5, at 1113 (explaining the widely offered “standard-form revocable trusts with fill-in-the blank
beneficiary designations”).
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to revocable trusts. 9 Additionally, many other problems that arise when
disposing of a testator’s property at death may also arise with a settlor’s
use of a revocable trust, 10 and there is a recent trend toward resolving
these problems by looking to the law of wills. 11 Consequently, in Ohio,
several statutory rules that apply to wills have been extended to apply to
revocable trusts. 12
This Comment argues that the Ohio legislature should similarly
extend the wills pretermitted heir statute to revocable trusts. Part II of
this Comment provides the statutory background of the Ohio
pretermitted heir statute and a review of Ohio cases involving the
application of the law of wills to revocable trusts, as well as the few nonOhio cases that have addressed the issue of whether pretermitted heir
statutes are applicable to revocable trusts. Part III addresses whether
Ohio’s pretermitted heir statute, although not explicitly applicable to
revocable trusts, nevertheless could be so applied and concludes that it is
unlikely that an Ohio court would apply the current pretermitted heir
statute to a revocable trust. Part IV addresses whether Ohio’s
pretermitted heir statute should be amended to apply to revocable trusts,
the most commonly used will-substitute, 13 and considers the rationale
for such an amendment. Part V of this Comment then proposes two
alternatives for the Ohio legislature to resolve this issue. First, Part V
recommends that the legislature enact a statute that will provide
guidance in the application of wills statutes to revocable trusts more
broadly, as these interpretation and constructional issues will continue to
arise in many other contexts. 14 Second, Part V recommends and
concludes that the legislature should amend the pretermitted heir statute
9. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 2, at 550 (explaining that it is difficult to defend the
UPC’s treatment of a decedent’s failure to modify his will after the birth of a child as unintentional,
but not to similarly treat a decedent’s failure to modify his revocable trust).
10. Id. at 523-24; see also Langbein, supra note 5, at 1136-37 (emphasizing the necessity of
acknowledging the will-like character of will substitutes in order to achieve uniform resolutions to
“functionally identical problems”).
11. Newman, supra note 2, at 524-25; Langbein, supra note 5, at 1141 (“The law of wills has
reached sound solutions to these interpretive questions, and I have urged that these solutions should
extend presumptively to the will-like transfers of the nonprobate system.”); William M. McGovern
Jr., Nonprobate Transfers Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1329, 1352
(1992) (“The sensible rules developed as guides to the construction of wills ought to be applied to
will substitutes.”).
12. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.33(D) (West, Westlaw through File 2 of the
132nd GA (2017-2018)) (Revocation of will by divorce); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5815.31
(Revocation of trust by divorce).
13. Moore, supra note 8.
14. See id.; see also Brian Layman, The Traditional Wills Doctrine of Ademption and Its
Exceptions Should be Extended to Revocable Trusts, 13 OHIO PROB. L.J. 119 (2003).
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to apply to inter-vivos revocable trusts.
II. BACKGROUND
In every state except Louisiana, a testator may disinherit a child.15
Although most states provide some protection against unintentional
disinheritance of a child or heir, the protection differs by state. 16 The
extent of protection may be dependent upon whether a state has enacted
an omitted child or pretermitted heir statute. For example, some statutes
apply only to children born after the execution of the will, 17 while others
also protect more remote descendants.18 Generally, such statutes do not
offer protection to a child born before the execution of the will; 19
however, a few statutes protect any omitted child or heir, whether alive
or not when the will was executed, from inadvertent disinheritance. 20
Although these statutes differ, their fundamental purpose of carrying out
the decedent’s presumed intent remains the same. 21
A.

Ohio’s Pretermitted Heir Statute—Section 2107.34 of the Ohio
Revised Code

Ohio enacted a pretermitted heir statute in 1932, 22 which was
amended in 1961. 23 Prior to the enactment of the statute, the birth of a
child revoked the testator’s will. 24 Under the 1932 statute, if a testator
15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.6
note 19 (AM. LAW INST. 2003); see also LA. CONST. ANN. art. 12, § 5 (Westlaw through Jan. 1,
2017) (Forced heirship and trusts).
16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.6
note 18.
17. See id. § 9.6 cmt. c. Generally, omitted child statutes apply only to afterborn children and
also apply to children adopted after the execution of the will. See id. § 9.6(a).
18. Id. § 9.6 cmt. a. Some pretermitted heir statutes apply only to children and some apply
also to more remote descendants. See id. § 9.6 cmt. d; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.34
(West, Westlaw through File 2 of the 132nd GA (2017-2018)) (If the afterborn child dies before the
testator, the deceased child’s issue or heir receives the share the parent would have received if
living.).
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.6(a).
20. See id. § 9.6 cmt d. See OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 132 (West, Westlaw through First
Session of the 56th Legislature (2017)) for an example of a statute that protects children born before
or after the execution of the will.
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.6
cmt. i.
22. OHIO GEN. CODE. § 10504.49 (1932) (Afterborn or pretermitted heirs; effect on will).
23. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.34 (West, Westlaw through File 2 of the 132nd GA (20172018)).
24. The General Code of the State of Ohio Section 10504.49 (1932) (Afterborn or
pretermitted heirs; effect on will) superseded Section 10561 (Birth of a child) (1910) which
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had a living child and executed a will, which left nothing to the child nor
mentioned an afterborn child, and then later had an afterborn child
without revising or revoking the will, the afterborn child would take an
intestate share and the living child would be disinherited. 25
Under Ohio’s current pretermitted heir statute, if a testator makes a
will and, following the execution of the will, has or adopts a child, and
there is no provision in the will for the pretermitted child or that child’s
heir or issue, the will is not revoked. 26 Instead, the pretermitted heir will
receive a share equal to what the person would have received out of the
estate that is not devised to a surviving spouse (had the testator died
intestate without a surviving spouse) 27 unless it appears by the will that
the testator intended to disinherit the pretermitted heir.28 Similarly, if the
pretermitted heir dies before the testator, the issue of the deceased
pretermitted heir will receive the share that the parent would have
received if still alive. 29
Following the policy of the 1961 amendment, Ohio’s current
pretermitted heir statute protects children that, at the time of will
execution, were not born, not considered, or were overlooked. 30 Such
considerations should also apply to children who were not born, not
considered, or were overlooked at the creation of a trust instrument.
However, no court in Ohio has yet addressed this issue, and courts from
other jurisdictions that have done so have been unwilling to apply a wills
provided:
If a testator had no children at the time of executing his will, but afterward has a child
living, or born alive after his death, such will shall be revoked, unless provision has been
made for such child by some settlement, or he is provided for in the will, or in such a
way mentioned therein as to show an intention not to make such provision. No other evidence to rebut the presumption of revocation shall be received.
OHIO GEN. CODE. § 10561 (1910). See also Ash v. Ash, 9 Ohio St. 383, 384 (1959) (holding that
the will remained revoked following the birth of testatrix’s child even though the testatrix survived
the child).
25. OHIO GEN. CODE. § 10504.49 (1932).
26. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.34. Even today in some states, a previous will is revoked
after the birth of a child. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-5-3 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg.
Sess.).
27. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.3(A) (The heir receives only a share of the property that
was not devised to the surviving spouse.). For the statute to apply, the afterborn child must be born
within 300 days following the testator’s date of death. See id. § 2107.34(C). However, if the
testator’s will provides for a posthumously conceived child, the child may take under the statute if
born within at least one year and 300 days following the testator’s death. See id.
28. Id. § 2107.3(A). Ohio’s pretermitted heir statute protects not only children born to, or
adopted by, the testator after the execution of the will, but also persons designated by the testator as
heirs under Section 2105.15 of the Ohio Revised Code. Id.
29. Id.
30. See id.
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pretermitted heir statute to a revocable trust.31
B.

Ohio Supreme Court’s Application of Wills Rules to Revocable
Trusts

Although the issue of whether Ohio’s wills pretermitted heir statute
should be applicable to revocable trusts has never been addressed by an
Ohio court, Ohio courts have addressed other issues involving the
application of the law of wills to revocable trusts. 32
For example, in Ohio, a surviving spouse who is not provided for in
a decedent’s will is given the right to elect against the will and receive a
share of the decedent’s estate. 33 In Dumas v. Estate of Dumas, the Ohio
Supreme Court considered whether to allow a surviving spouse to elect a
forced share from a decedent’s revocable trust. 34 Reversing the judgment
of the court of appeals and reaffirming the decision in Smyth, 35 the
Dumas Court held that a revocable trust existing at the time of the
settlor’s death “bars the settlor’s spouse from claiming a distributive
share in the trust assets under the statutes of descent and distribution.” 36
In her dissent in Dumas, Justice Resnick noted that by providing for
a surviving spouse’s right of election against a decedent’s will, the intent
of the General Assembly to protect the surviving spouse’s interests was
clear. 37 Justice Resnick criticized the majority for ignoring the interests
of those surviving spouses who are “overlooked” in the provisions of the
decedent’s trust instrument. 38 Justice Resnick placed great emphasis on
the significance of the surviving spouse’s rights and interests that the
General Assembly aimed to protect in such cases where a decedent’s
trust instrument passes all of the decedent’s property to a person other
than the surviving spouse, because from the surviving spouse’s

31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.6
note 17 (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“No cases have been found in which the protections by statute or
case law afforded to a child omitted from a will have been extended to apply to a child omitted from
a will substitute used as a comprehensive dispositive plan. Courts that have addressed the issue have
decided against expanding the policy.”).
32. See Dumas v. Estate of Dumas, 627 N.E.2d 978 (Ohio 1994); see also Dollar Sav. Tr. Co.
of Youngstown v. Turner, 529 N.E.2d 1261 (Ohio 1988).
33. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2106.01.
34. Dumas, 627 N.E.2d at 982-83.
35. Smyth v. Cleveland Tr. Co., 179 N.E.2d 60 (Ohio 1961).
36. Dumas, 627 N.E.2d at 983. According to the Court, this is the case in the absence of
fraud. Id. However, Ohio is in the minority, because in most states, a surviving spouse can elect a
forced share of assets in a decedent’s revocable trust. See Moore, supra note 8, at 8.
37. Dumas, 627 N.E.2d at 983 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
38. Id.
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viewpoint, there is no difference between a will and a trust.39
Justice Resnick then noted that application of the broad rule in
Smyth could result in “grave injustices” and could ultimately result in
married persons successfully disinheriting their spouses. 40 In Justice
Resnick’s view, to determine when a surviving spouse can elect against
a decedent’s inter-vivos trust, the interests of the surviving spouse and
the right of the decedent to dispose of his or her property must be
weighed. 41 According to Justice Resnick, by drafting a bill that balances
theses interests, the General Assembly could correct the inequities that
result from the majority’s broad reading of the Smyth holding that a
revocable trust “is never reachable by a surviving spouse who exercises
the right of election.” 42
In Dollar Savings Trust Co. v. Turner, the Supreme Court of Ohio
addressed the issue of whether Ohio’s anti-lapse statute 43 applied to trust
agreements. 44 The court reasoned that although on its face the statute
was applicable only to wills, its application to trust agreements furthered
the intent of the legislature. 45 Because the inter-vivos trust essentially
became a testamentary instrument at the settlor’s death, the court
explained that applying the anti-lapse statute to a revocable trust was
“wholly consistent” with the legislature’s intent in enacting the statute.46
Reversing the decision of the court below, the court held that the antilapse statute was applicable to trusts and therefore the death of the settlor
would prevent the failure of a gift contained within the trust.47
Following this decision, however, the Ohio General Assembly
amended Sections 2107.01 and 2107.52 of the Ohio Revised Code in
response to the court’s decision in Dollar Savings. 48 Section 2107.01(A)
expressly states that a “‘will’ does not include inter-vivos trusts.” 49 This
reversal of the holding in Dollar Savings by the General Assembly
suggests that in order to make additional wills rules of construction

39. Id. at 984.
40. Id. at 985.
41. Id. at 984.
42. Id. at 986.
43. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.52 (West, Westlaw through File 2 of the 132nd GA (20172018)).
44. Dollar Sav. Tr. Co. of Youngstown v. Turner, 529 N.E.2d 1261, 1263 (Ohio 1988).
45. Id. at 1264.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Act of July 8, 1992, § 3, 1992 Ohio Laws File 212.
49. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.01(A) (West, Westlaw through File 2 of the 132nd GA
(2017-2018)).
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applicable to trusts, specific statutes must be enacted. 50 Recently, in fact,
the General Assembly did just that by enacting Section 5808.19 of the
Revised Code, which extended the anti-lapse wills rule of construction
to trusts. 51
C.

Other State Courts Have Declined to Apply the Wills Pretermitted
Heir Statute to Trusts

Although the issue of whether Ohio’s pretermitted heir statute is
applicable to revocable trusts has never been addressed in an Ohio case,
several other state courts have addressed the issue with respect to their
states’ pretermitted heir statutes. 52 Consistently, these courts have held
that wills pretermitted heir statutes are not applicable to revocable
trusts. 53
For example, in the case of In re Estate of Jackson, the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma addressed whether Oklahoma’s pretermitted heir
statute applied to a revocable inter-vivos trust. 54 The plaintiff
unsuccessfully argued that children and surviving spouses, as forced
heirs under pretermitted heir statutes, should be treated the same. 55 The
court considered an earlier Oklahoma case in which the court had
applied the wills elective share statute that protects surviving spouses to
a revocable trust. 56 Despite having done so, the court in Jackson
contrasted such forced heir statutes, which limit a married person’s
power to dispose of his or her property, with Oklahoma’s pretermitted
heir statute, which was not intended to be a limitation on a testator’s
power, but rather to assure that a child was not unintentionally omitted
from a will. 57 Consequently, the court found that the pretermitted heir
statute “unambiguously pertain[ed] to only wills,” and refused to extend
it to a situation where a child is omitted from a revocable inter-vivos
trust instrument. 58
The Supreme Court of Arkansas followed similar reasoning in
50. David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000) and Its Application to Ohio, 30 CAP.
U. L. REV. 1, 11 (2002).
51. See infra Part III.C.
52. See In re Estate of Jackson, 2008 OK 83, 194 P.3d 1269; Kidwell v. Rhew, 268 S.W.3d
309 (Ark. 2007); Robbins v. Johnson, 780 A.2d 1282 (N.H. 2001); In re Estate of Cayo, 342
N.W.2d 785 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
53. See infra Part II.C.
54. Jackson, 2008 OK 83, ¶ 1.
55. Id. ¶ 18-22.
56. Thomas v. Bank of Okla., N.A., 1984 OK 41, 684 P.2d 553.
57. Jackson, 2008 OK 83, ¶ 17-23.
58. Id. ¶ 17.
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Kidwell v. Rhew. 59 In Kidwell, the court considered the “clear language
and express terms” of the Arkansas pretermitted heir statute and held
that it was only applicable to wills.60 The plaintiff argued that had the
decedent disposed of her estate by a Last Will and Testament with the
same terms as provided in the decedent’s revocable trust instrument, the
child would have had rights as a pretermitted heir under the statute. 61
However, the court rejected this argument by reasoning that “will” and
“trust” are not interchangeable terms, and that the pretermitted heir
statute does not apply unless there is a will.62
The plaintiff in Kidwell also unsuccessfully argued that the court
should follow the Restatement (Second) of Property, which provides that
in the absence of a controlling statute, when a descendant of a donor is
omitted as a beneficiary under a will substitute or revocable transfer, the
policy of the controlling statute applicable to wills should be “applied by
analogy” to the omitted beneficiary. 63 Declining to adopt that approach
of the Second Restatement, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the
statutory language of the pretermitted heir statute was clear and
unambiguous and that it was not necessary to look to rules of
construction. 64
In Robbins v. Johnson, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
addressed whether a pretermitted heir statute was applicable to a trust. 65
The plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that because the trust functioned
like a will, by providing for the distribution of property after the settlor’s
death, the pretermitted heir statute should apply. 66 The Court examined
the language of the statute and found that the statute was specifically
applicable only to wills. 67 The court reasoned that it was the role of the
legislature to decide, as a matter of policy, whether the pretermitted heir

59. Kidwell v. Rhew, 268 S.W.3d 309 (Ark. 2007).
60. Id. at 312.
61. Id. at 311. Arkansas’ pretermitted heir statute applies to living descendants who have
been omitted from the testator’s will, and in this case, the omitted child was living when the
revocable trust was established. See id.
62. Id. at 312.
63. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 34.2 (AM. LAW
INST. 1992)).
64. Id. The court pointed to the preface to the Statutory Note and Reporter’s Note of the
Restatement, explaining that no cases have been found that have extended an omitted child statute
to apply to will substitutes. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 34.2). As such, the plaintiff offered no convincing authority to compel the court to extend the
statute. Id.
65. Robbins v. Johnson, 780 A.2d 1282, 1283 (N.H. 2001).
66. Id. at 1283-84.
67. Id.
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statute should be extended to will substitutes, and “absent clear
indication from the legislature” of this intention, the court declined to
extend the statute to trusts. 68
Finally, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin in In re Estate of Cayo,
considered whether Wisconsin’s pretermitted heir statute applied to a
parent’s failure to provide for an afterborn child in a revocable trust
instrument. 69 In Cayo, the decedent executed a will and a trust naming
her only then-living child as the sole beneficiary. 70 The afterborn child’s
guardian ad litem argued that the afterborn child, under Wisconsin’s
pretermitted heir statute, was entitled to one-half of the decedent’s assets
under the will and the trust. 71 The Cayo court explained that the
unambiguous words of the statute “must be given their obvious and
ordinary meaning.” 72 Because the statute applied only to wills and did
not contemplate a settlor’s failure to provide for an afterborn child in a
trust, the court held that the afterborn child was a beneficiary under the
will but not the revocable trust.73
III. THE APPLICABILITY OF OHIO’S CURRENT PRETERMITTED HEIR
STATUTE TO REVOCABLE TRUSTS
Although some state courts have held that their pretermitted heir
statutes do not extend to revocable trusts, public policy suggests that
Ohio’s pretermitted heir statute should be applied in such a way, because
the presumed intent of a testator not to disinherit an afterborn (or
adopted) child is equally applicable to the settlor of a revocable trust.74
However, under the plain language of the statute, Ohio’s pretermitted
heir statute is limited to wills. Thus, if an Ohio court were to be
presented with this issue, it would be necessary for the court to
determine whether Ohio’s pretermitted heir statute, even in the absence
of explicit statutory authority, could nevertheless be applied to a
revocable trust.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 1284.
In re Estate of Cayo, 342 N.W.2d 785, 786 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 787.
Id.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25 cmt. e(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2003);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 34.2(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1992).
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Applying Ohio’s Pretermitted Heir Statute to Trusts is Consistent
with Persuasive Authority

Although the Ohio pretermitted heir statute does not explicitly
apply to trusts, there is some authority that suggests that pretermitted
heir protection and other wills rules should nevertheless apply to
revocable trusts and other will substitutes, even when the statutory
authority for doing so is lacking. 75 For example, Section 25 comment
e(1) of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts provides:
[A]n array of statutes are found throughout the various American jurisdictions that are designed as protections or aids against oversight or
inadequacies in the planning and drafting of wills. These statutes often
fail specifically to address revocable inter vivos trusts . . . .
Illustrative are pretermitted-heir statutes . . . .
Sound policy suggests that a property owner’s choice of form in using
a revocable trust rather than a will as the central instrument of an estate
plan should not deprive that property owner and the objects of his or
her bounty of appropriate aids and safeguards intended to achieve likely intentions. Thus, although a particular statute of this general type
fails to address trusts that are revocable but nontestatmentary, the legislation should ordinarily be applied as if trust dispositive provisions
that are to be carried out after the settlor’s death had been made by
will. 76

The Ohio Supreme Court in Dollar Savings adopted an approach similar
to that of the Third Restatement, explaining that a remedial statute, such
as the wills anti-lapse statute at issue, “should be extended ‘beyond its
actual language to cases within its reason and general intent,’” 77
allowing for the statute to be “liberally construed in favor of the persons

75. See supra note 5.
76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25 cmt. e(1) (discussing statutory protections
against oversight including pretermitted heir and anti-lapse statutes); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2; Langbein, supra note 5, at 1137
(explaining that the subsidiary rules for probate and nonprobate transfers should be consistently
applied as a matter of legislative policy).
77. Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co. of Youngstown v. Turner, 529 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (Ohio 1988)
(quoting Rice v. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co., 99 N.E.2d 301, 304 (Ohio 1951)); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 reporter’s note
to cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“The operative canon of statutory construction that allows a court
to apply a statute to a will substitute although the statute’s terms speak only of a will is that ‘[t]o
effect its purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text.’”) (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn,
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to
be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950)).
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to be benefited.” 78 Based on the court’s reasoning in Dollar Savings,
child B, from the hypothetical presented in the Introduction to this
Comment, as a person to be benefited from the language of the statute,
would receive a share of Settlor’s revocable trust. Moreover, because the
Ohio General Assembly has extended several statutory rules that apply
to wills to revocable trusts, this may suggest some receptiveness from
the legislature.79 However, even though there is support for applying the
wills pretermitted heir statute to revocable trusts, it is unlikely this alone
would be enough to persuade an Ohio court to do so. 80
B.

It is Unlikely an Ohio Court Would Extend the Pretermitted Heir
Statute to Revocable Trusts

First, it is important to consider the clear and unambiguous
language of the Ohio pretermitted heir statute, which reads, in relevant
part:
If, after making a will, a testator has a child born alive, [or] adopts a
child, . . . [u]nless it appears by the will that it was the intention of the
testator to disinherit the pretermitted child or heir, the devises and legacies granted by the will, except those to a surviving spouse, shall be
abated proportionately, or in any other manner that is necessary to give
effect to the intention of the testator as shown by the will . . . . 81

Based on the plain language of the statute and the Ohio General
Assembly’s response to Dollar Savings, which was the enactment of a
new Ohio statute defining “will” to expressly exclude inter-vivos
trusts, 82 it is unlikely an Ohio court would extend the statute to a
revocable trust. This reading of the plain language is consistent with the
Ohio Supreme Court’s refusal to apply the wills elective share statute to
revocable trusts in Dumas. 83
Additionally, the Ohio legislature has been selective in its
enactment of various statutes making wills rules applicable to revocable

78. Dollar Sav., 529 N.E.2d at 1264 (quoting State ex rel. Maher v. Baker, 102 N.E. 732, 734
(Ohio 1913)).
79. Although the General Assembly reversed the holding of Dollar Savings, it has more
recently extended the anti-lapse statute at issue in Dollar Savings, as well as several other statutes,
to revocable trusts. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.19 (West, Westlaw through File 2 of the
132nd GA (2017-2018)) (Anti-lapse); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5815.31 (Revocation by divorce).
80. See infra Part III.B.
81. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.34 (emphasis added).
82. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.01(A).
83. Dumas v. Estate of Dumas, 627 N.E.2d 978 (Ohio 1994).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

13

Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 3, Art. 7

618

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[50:605

trusts in specific contexts. 84 Notably, however, the legislature has not
extended the wills law in the pretermitted heir context.85 Furthermore,
even the Uniform Probate Code, which in many contexts makes wills
rules applicable to revocable trusts, does not do so in its pretermitted
heir statute. 86
C.

The Uniform Probate Code

The 1990 revision of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) set out to
unify the law of probate and nonprobate transfers by first recognizing
that will substitutes and inter-vivos transfers have become a major form
of wealth transmission today. 87 Based in part on the idea that the
presumptions about a decedent’s intent supplied by wills rules may be
equally applicable to comparable provisions found in other governing
instruments, the 1990 revisions reformed wills rules of construction such
that several rules 88 were restructured to apply to wills and all other
governing instruments. 89 However, the 1990 revisions also included a
section of rules that are applicable only to wills,90 thus extending only
selected wills construction rules to nonprobate transfers.
The UPC omitted children statute appears in a section entitled
“Spouse and Children Unprovided for in Wills” and reads, “[I]f a
testator fails to provide in his will for any of his [or her] children born or
adopted after the execution of the will . . . [the] child receives a share in
the estate.” 91 So, unlike other wills construction rules, the UPC’s omitted
84. See infra Part IV.C.
85. See Lauren Ashley Gribble, Comment, Justice Before Generosity: Creditors’ Claim to
Assets of a Revocable Trust After the Death of the Settlor, 48 AKRON L. REV. 383, 413 (2015)
(“[L]egislative intent may be inferred from what the . . . legislature did not do.”).
86. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-302 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 194-95 (2013); Newman, supra
note 2, at 550.
87. UNIF. PROB. CODE prefatory note (1990).
88. See Article II, Part 7 of the Uniform Probate Code for rules of construction, such as the
120-hour survivorship rule, that apply to wills and other governing instruments. Article II, Part 8
also provides general provisions that apply to both probate and nonprobate transfers, including
revocation upon divorce and the elective share statute. Finally, some provisions extend concepts
from the law of wills to apply to certain nonprobate assets. For example, the wills anti-lapse statute,
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603, is extended by Section 2-207 to future interest in trusts.
89. UNIF. PROB. CODE prefatory note (1990).
90. Id. See Article II, Part 6 of the Code for rules of construction that are applicable only to
wills, for example ademption by satisfaction.
91. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-302 (emphasis added). If, however, the testator has one or more
living children when the will is executed and the will does not make a devise for the then-living
children, any afterborn or after-adopted children will not receive a share of the estate under the UPC
omitted child statute. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 9.6 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
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child statute is not extended to revocable trusts, and an omitted child’s
share is thus limited to probate property. 92 In the Prefatory Note, the
drafters make clear that some of the wills construction rules
appropriately apply only to wills, such as ademption by satisfaction. 93
However, neither the Prefatory Note, nor the comment to the UPC’s
omitted child statute, offers an explanation as to why the omitted child
statute is applicable only to wills. 94
D.

The Restatement (Third) of Property

Similar to the UPC, a policy of the Restatement (Third) of Property
is that wills rules of construction and other rules that aid in giving effect
to a decedent’s presumed intent should be generally applicable to
donative documents. 95 Notably, a comment to Section 7.2 of the Third
Restatement addresses making wills rules applicable to will substitutes
on a selective basis in the context of protection against disinheritance. 96
However, Section 9.6, which provides for the protection of a child or
descendant against unintentional disinheritance, applies only to wills. 97
Because Ohio courts have been largely unwilling to apply wills
rules to revocable trusts, 98 it is unlikely that an Ohio court would choose
to do so with the clear and unambiguous language of the current Ohio
pretermitted heir statute and the specific statute enacted after Dollar
Savings defining a will not to include a trust.99 Similarly, other state
courts that have addressed the issue have been unwilling to extend wills
pretermitted heir statutes to revocable trusts. 100 Moreover, because state
supreme courts decided such cases, they may be broadly interpreted by

92. Melanie B. Leslie & Stewart E. Sterk, Revisiting the Revolution: Reintegrating the
Wealth Transmission System, 56 B.C. L. REV. 61, 69, 114-15 (2015) (explaining that although this
is the approach taken in most states, by failing to apply the omitted children provision to nonprobate
assets such as revocable trusts, the UPC does not go far enough in extending the rules of
construction to nonprobate transfers); see also Newman, supra note 2, at 570 (noting the UPC’s
failure to extend the pretermitted heir statute to trusts, though contrary to the goal of the UPC to
unify the laws applicable to probate and nonprobate transfer).
93. UNIF. PROB. CODE prefatory note (1990).
94. See id.
95. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 cmt.
a.
96. Id. cmt. g.
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.6.
98. E.g., Dumas v. Estate of Dumas, 627 N.E.2d 978 (Ohio 1994).
99. See Schwickerath, supra note 8, at 810 n.279 (noting the consistency in the Ohio
Supreme Court’s application of plain language of the statutes, as well as the Court’s indifference to
legislative policy).
100. See supra Part II.C.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

15

Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 3, Art. 7

620

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[50:605

the lower courts and may continue to yield “intent-defeating results.” 101
Thus, for the Ohio pretermitted heir statute to be applicable to revocable
trusts, an amendment of the statute by the General Assembly is
necessary. 102 Although a vast majority of states’ pretermitted heir
statutes apply only to wills, 103 Ohio would not be the first state to
provide protection to a child inadvertently omitted from a revocable
trust. 104
IV. RATIONALE FOR AMENDING THE PRETERMITTED HEIR STATUTE TO
REVOCABLE TRUSTS
Because wills were historically the basic method for transferring
property upon death, it follows that some rules of construction were
drafted to apply only to wills. 105 A majority of state courts and
legislatures have been slow to respond to the vast increase in the use of
revocable trusts as will substitutes. 106 By failing to extend wills
pretermitted heir statutes to revocable trusts, the policy of such statutes
to protect unintentionally disinherited children or heirs is undermined. 107
By extending certain wills rules to revocable trusts and other nonprobate
transfers, a few state legislatures have successfully demonstrated the
movement toward unifying the law of wills and will substitutes, a policy
recognized by the Restatements, the Uniform Probate Code, and the
Uniform Trust Code alike. 108
101. Leslie & Sterk, supra note 92, at 69 n.45.
102. See English, supra note 50, at 11; see also Schwickerath, supra note 8, at 813-14
(“Judicial intervention can make only piecemeal efforts to solve this problem of inconsistency.”).
103. Newman, supra note 2, at 550.
104. See infra Part IV.A.
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 cmt. a
(AM. LAW INST. 2003).
106. Id.; see also Schwickerath, supra note 8, at 814 (“Unless and until broad based legislative
reform takes place, many states will remain in the quagmire of uncertainty concerning the
applicability of policy-driven substantive restrictions on testation to a decedent’s nonprobate, but
essentially testamentary transfers. . . . [I]t seems unlikely that legislatures will be willing to review
the importance of those policies expressed in their probate codes to determine whether their reach
should be extended.”).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 34.2 cmt. g (AM. LAW
INST. 1992); id. § 34.2(2). (“[T]he policy of the statute in the controlling state applicable to an
omitted issue in a will should be applied by analogy to the omitted issue in the substitute for a will,
or in the transfer revocable by the donor at the time of the donor’s death.”).
108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 cmt. a
(“[R]ules of construction and other interpretative devices aid in determining and giving effect to the
donor’s intention or probable intention and hence should apply generally to donative documents.”);
UNIF. PROB. CODE prefatory note (1990) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (explaining the policy of
unifying the law of probate and nonprobate transfers); UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2010) (noting a basic policy of the UTC is to treat revocable trusts as equivalent to
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Several States Have Properly Extended the Pretermitted Heir
Statute to Revocable Trusts

A few states have enacted statutes that extend the pretermitted heir
statute to revocable trusts. This has been accomplished by state
legislatures in different ways. For example, the Iowa legislature enacted
a separate provision that effectively extends Iowa’s wills pretermitted
heir statute 109 to revocable trusts. 110 The enactment of this statute by the
Iowa legislature was an attempt to unify the law of wills and the law of
revocable trusts. 111 However, it has been argued that there is no
coordination between Iowa’s pretermitted heir statute applicable to wills
and the statute applicable to revocable trusts. 112 Because the statutes
treat wills and trusts separately and fail to address several problems that
could potentially arise when a decedent implements a will and revocable
trust into his or her estate plan, such problems may require resolution by
the Iowa courts. 113
Conversely, other states have enacted pretermitted heir statutes that
apply to both probate and nonprobate property. 114 For example, in 1994
the California legislature extended all of its wills rules of construction to
revocable trusts. 115 The pretermitted heir provisions of the California
Probate Code apply to “testamentary instrument[s],” which include a
wills).
109. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.267 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
110. Id. § 633A.3106.
111. Martin D. Begleiter, In the Code We Trust – Some Trust Law for Iowa at Last, 49 DRAKE
L. REV. 165, 219 (2001). The revocation-by-divorce provision of the Iowa statutes, Section
633.3107, was another wills law that was extended by the Iowa legislature to revocable trusts. Id. at
219-20.
112. See Martin D. Begleiter, Son of the Trust Code – The Iowa Trust Code After Ten Years,
59 DRAKE L. REV. 265, 331 (2011).
113. Id. For example, the statutes do not address what would happen if afterborn children were
not mentioned in the revocable trust but were mentioned in the will. Id.
114. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21601 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 4 of 2017 Reg. Sess.); 20 PA.
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7710.2 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); see also MO.
ANN. STAT. § 461.059 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Veto Sess. of the 98th GA). Missouri’s statute
applies more generally to nonprobate transfers and distinguishes the wills pretermitted heir statute
from the statute that is applicable to nonprobate transfers by providing that “[n]o law intended to
protect a spouse or child from unintentional disinheritance by the will of a testator shall apply to a
nonprobate transfer.” MO. ANN. STAT. § 461.059. However, because “nonprobate transfer,” as
defined in Section 461.005 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, “does not include . . . a transfer under a
trust established by an individual, either inter vivos or testamentary,” the statute does not apply to
revocable trusts. Id. § 461.005. Like the California statute, Section 461.059 has been analyzed as an
“awkward attempt” by the Missouri legislature to extend the protection of the omitted-child statute
to nonprobate transfers. Grayson M.P. McCouch, Will Substitutes Under the Revised Uniform
Probate Code, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1123, 1180 n.250 (1993).
115. English, supra note 50, at 12.
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“decedent’s will or revocable trust.” 116 Under Section 21620, an omitted
child receives a share of the estate,117 including the decedent’s probate
estate and property held in a revocable trust, which the child would have
received had the decedent died without executing a testamentary
instrument. 118 However, the “simplistic approach” of the California
statutes has been described as only a partial success because it ignores
the differences between trusts and wills. 119
Pennsylvania took a similar approach by enacting Section 7710.2 of
the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes in 2006. 120 Section 7710.2
provides that “[t]he rules of construction that apply in this
Commonwealth to the provisions of testamentary trusts also apply as
appropriate to the provisions of inter vivos trusts.” 121 Pennsylvania’s
pretermitted heir statute can be found in Section 2507(4), which states
that if a testator fails to provide in his will for an afterborn or afteradopted child, the child receives a share of the property not passing to a
surviving spouse. 122 Although Section 2507(4) expressly refers to a child
unintentionally disinherited from a will, a comment to Section 7710.2
explains that “section [7710.2] imports section 2507 . . . and other
statutory and judicial rules of interpretation that apply to trusts under
wills.” 123 Thus, Section 7110.2 operates to include revocable trust assets
into the property distributable as an intestate share under Pennsylvania’s
pretermitted heir statute in Section 2507(4). 124
B.

Because Revocable Trusts Are Functionally Equivalent to Wills, the
Pretermitted Heir Statute Should Similarly Apply

It has been argued that the UPC appropriately did not extend the
omitted child provisions to will substitutes.125 For example, in order to
116. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21601.
117. Id. § 21620. Estate is defined as “a decedent’s probate estate and all property held in any
revocable trust that becomes irrevocable on the death of the decedent” Id. § 21601.
118. Id. § 21620.
119. English, supra note 50, at 12.
120. 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7710.2 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.).
This provision is a codification of Section 112 of the UTC. See infra Part V.A.
121. 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7710.2 (emphasis added).
122. 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2507(4).
123. 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7710.2 cmt.
124. Id. § 7710.2; see also In re Tr. Under Deed of Kulig, 131 A.3d 494, 500 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2015), appeal granted, No. 217 MAL 2016, 2016 WL 5820602 (Pa. Oct. 4, 2016) (discussing the
applicability of Section 7710.2 to a revocable trust in determining a decedent’s intent in the
pretermitted spouse context, noting that the “comment [to Section 7710.2] references Section 2507
in its entirety”).
125. See McCouch, supra note 114, at 1179.
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determine whether the testator intended to disinherit an omitted child, it
may be impractical to inquire into a testator’s comprehensive dispositive
plan for each individual will substitute.126 This argument, however,
applies to single-asset will substitutes rather than revocable trusts,127
which, like wills, usually provide a comprehensive dispositive plan. 128
While it may be unreasonable and difficult to extend the pretermitted
heir statute to include all standard single-asset will substitutes, 129 this
same rationale does not necessarily apply to revocable trusts.130 Because
revocable trusts are functionally equivalent to wills 131 and are generally
used as will substitutes in order to avoid probate administration, the
basis for inconsistent treatment of wills and revocable trusts is
lacking. 132
C.

The Ohio General Assembly Has, on a Case-by-Case Basis,
Extended Wills Rules to Trusts

The General Assembly has made many wills rules also apply to
revocable trusts. This has been accomplished in different ways. For
example, some of the wills rules have been extended to trusts by the
enactment of separate statutes and provisions that apply specifically to
revocable trusts. 133 Conversely, some Ohio statutes are broad enough to
apply to both probate and nonprobate transfers, including revocable
trusts. 134

126. Id. Because a will disposes of residual property, it is reasonable to take into account the
testator’s dispositive plan when interpreting a will. Id.
127. See id. at 1180 n.250.
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 34.2 cmt. g (AM. LAW
INST. 1992) (Because a revocable trust usually involves “multiple benefits being shared among
described beneficiaries,” a situation in which a revocable trust instrument is used is analogous to a
situation in which a will is used.); see also Langbein, supra note 5, at 1115 n.32 (explaining that
unlike single-asset will substitutes, such as pay-on-death accounts and life insurance, revocable
trusts can apply to all types of property).
129. Leslie & Sterk, supra note 92, at 69 (explaining the complexity of drafting an omitted
child statute to cover nonprobate transfers).
130. Newman, supra note 2, at 550.
131. Under the UTC, a revocable trust is functionally equivalent to a will while the settlor is
living. David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues,
67 MO. L. REV. 143, 187 (2002). Moreover, the capacity requirement for the creation, revocation, or
amendment of a trust is also the capacity standard that applies to wills. Id; see also UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 601 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
132. Langbein, supra note 5, at 1136-37.
133. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.19 (West, Westlaw through File 2 of the 132nd
GA (2017-2018)) (Anti-lapse); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5815.31 (Revocation by divorce).
134. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19 (Slayer rule); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2113.86 (Apportionment of taxes).
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As mentioned in Part II of this Comment, 135 by enacting Section
5808.19 of the Ohio Revised Code, the Ohio General Assembly
extended the wills anti-lapse statute to revocable trusts. 136 The statute
addresses problems, like the issue in Dollar Savings, 137 that occur when
a trust beneficiary—whether an individual or member of a class—
predeceases the decedent and determines whether the surviving
descendants of the beneficiary take the property that the beneficiary
would have been entitled to had the beneficiary survived. 138 Similar to
the Ohio statute that controls issues that arise when dealing with a
devisee under a will who predeceases the testator, 139 the provisions of
Section 5808.19 apply unless the trust instrument shows a contrary
intent by the settlor. 140
The General Assembly also enacted Section 5815.31, which
provides that upon a settlor’s divorce, dissolution, annulment, or actual
separation from settlor’s spouse, any provision in a revocable trust that
confers upon the settlor’s spouse any beneficial interest, power of
appointment, or nomination as a trustee or trust advisor is automatically
revoked. 141 This is equivalent to Section 2107.33(D) of the Revised
Code, which automatically revokes any provision in a will upon a
testator’s divorce, dissolution, annulment, or actual separation that
confers upon the former spouse a disposition of property, power of
appointment, or nomination in the will as executor, trustee, or
guardian. 142 In fact, the most recent amendment to Section 5815.31,
which added language clarifying that divorce terminates “any beneficial
interest,” reaffirms the intent of the General Assembly that divorce
revokes the same interest in revocable trusts as it does beneficial
interests under wills. 143
135. Supra Part II.
136. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.19.
137. Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co. of Youngstown v. Turner, 529 N.E.2d 1261 (Ohio 1988).
138. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.19 (B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).
139. Id. § 2107.52. This was the statute that the Ohio Supreme Court in Dollar Savings held
was applicable to revocable trusts. See supra Part II.B.
140. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.19(B)(2); see also John D. Clark, Antilapse Statutes for
Wills and Trusts: Rules of Construction & Expanded Statutory Distribution Authority for Trustee,
22 OHIO PROB. L.J. NL 6 (2012) (explaining that because the statute addresses only trusts that are
not clear on the settlor’s intent, the statute will not apply to well drafted trusts); see also Langbein,
supra note 5, at 1137 (explaining that because financial intermediaries are cognizant of the lapse
problem, the anti-lapse statute would be applied to will substitutes only on occasion, but noting that
a variety of situations are not corrected by the business practices of financial intermediaries).
141. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5815.31.
142. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.33(D).
143. See William B. McNeil, Amended Sub. S.B. 106 Saved from the Savings Statute and
Other Changes, 20 OHIO PROB. L.J. 167 (2010) (citing Robert M. Brucken, Divorce and Revocable
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Similarly, the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, enacted by the
General Assembly in 2002, 144 aims to resolve issues that arise when a
governing instrument does not require a beneficiary to survive the
decedent by a stated period of time, and the beneficiary dies
simultaneously (or nearly simultaneously) with the decedent. 145 The
Ohio statute provides that for certain probate purposes 146 and for
purposes of a provision of a revocable trust agreement or other
governing instrument 147 relating to the person surviving an event, 148 a
person who does not survive another person by 120 hours, established
by clear and convincing evidence, is deemed to have predeceased the
other person. 149
Another example is Section 2105.19 of the Revised Code, 150 which
is commonly referred to as a “slayer statute.” 151 These statutes prevent a
slayer from benefitting from the decedent’s death. 152 The statute applies
to “[a]ll property of the decedent, and all money, insurance proceeds, or
other property or benefits payable or distributable in respect of the
decedent’s death.” 153 Under the statute, a person who causes the death of
the decedent is treated as having predeceased the decedent and becomes
a constructive trustee for the benefit of the individuals entitled to the
property. 154 Ohio courts have construed Section 2105.19 to be applicable

Trusts, 18 OHIO PROB. L.J. 196 (2008)).
144. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.31.
145. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-702 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); see also Edward
C. Halbach, Jr. & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC’s New Survivorship and Antilapse Provisions,
55 ALB. L. REV. 1091, 1095-96 (1992) (explaining that the survival requirement better serves the
decedent’s intent because the person who dies within 120 hours of the decedent will not likely
receive any personal benefit from the property and thus, the property should go to the decedent’s
heirs or devisees instead of the deceased beneficiary’s heirs or devisees).
146. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.32 (Determination of survivorship with respect to
specified person).
147. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.33 (Determination of survivorship with respect to
specified event). For purposes of this section, “governing instrument” includes a deed, will, trust,
insurance or annuity policy, account with a transfer-on-death designation or the abbreviation TOD,
account with a payable-on-death designation or the abbreviation POD, pension, profit-sharing,
retirement, or similar benefit plan, instrument creating or exercising a power of appointment or a
power of attorney, or a dispositive, appointive, or nominative instrument of any similar type. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.31(B).
148. “Event” includes the death of another person. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.31(D).
149. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2105.32-33.
150. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19.
151. Karen J. Sneddon, Should Cain’s Children Inherit Abel’s Property?: Wading into the
Extended Slayer Rule Quagmire, 76 UMKC L. REV. 101, 109 (2007).
152. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-803 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
153. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19(A).
154. Id. § 2105.19(A)-(B).
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to funds in joint and survivorship accounts 155 as well as to trusts. 156
Section 2113.86 of the Revised Code is another example of
recognition by the Ohio legislature that in some contexts the same rules
that apply to wills also should apply to revocable trusts.157 This statute
controls the apportionment of estate taxes unless the will or other
governing instrument provides otherwise. 158 Under the statute, the tax is
apportioned equitably against both gifts made in the clause of a will and
gifts made in a provision of a revocable trust, and is then reapportioned
to the residue of the estate or trust. 159
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE OHIO GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Ohio courts are unlikely to address an issue unless it is presented, 160
and even if an Ohio court resolved the pretermitted heir, revocable trust
issue, it is unlikely that an afterborn, pretermitted heir would be
protected by the current Ohio statute. 161 Thus, in order to address the
problem of inconsistent treatment between a child omitted under a will
and a child omitted from a revocable trust instrument, 162 action by the
Ohio General Assembly is necessary, as this problem is unlikely to be
resolved jurisprudentially. Corrective action by the General Assembly
would be consistent with the states that have legislatively extended their
pretermitted heir statutes to revocable trusts. This section of the
Comment proposes two recommendations for the General Assembly,
specifically, adopting Section 112 of the UTC and alternatively,
extending Ohio’s current pretermitted heir statute to revocable trusts.
With guidance from other state statutes and careful drafting, a statute can
be enacted that effectively prevents the inconsistent treatment of wills
and revocable trusts in the pretermitted heir context and fixes the current
problems inherent in the statutes of other states.

155. In re Estate of Fiore, 476 N.E.2d 1093, 1069 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). The Fiore court noted
that “[t]he language of the statute covers all property and all benefits payable in respect of
decedent’s death and is not limited to property that descends according to intestate succession laws
or passes by will.” Id. (emphasis added).
156. Evans v. Evans, 2014-Ohio-4450, 20 N.E.3d 1139, ¶ 45-46 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014).
157. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.86.
158. Id. § 2113.86(A).
159. Id. § 2113.86(B).
160. See Schwickerath, supra note 8, at 810 n.278.
161. See supra Part III.
162. For example, consider the hypothetical presented in Part I supra.
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Ohio Could, but is Unlikely to, Adopt Section 112 of the UTC
1. The Uniform Trust Code

The Uniform Trust Code (UTC), “the first national codification of
the law of trusts,” 163 was approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in August of 2000. 164 In
response to the increased use of trusts and “day-to-day questions” arising
related to trusts, 165 the UTC drafters set out to develop a uniform law to
provide “precise, comprehensive, and easily accessible guidance on trust
law questions.” 166 Modeled after existing state comprehensive trust
statutes, 167 the UTC incorporated existing Uniform Acts 168 and was
drafted in close coordination with the Restatement (Third) of Trusts. 169
The UTC also superseded some other Uniform Acts. 170 For example,
because Article VII of the UPC addressed only a limited number of
topics regarding trust administration, the UTC superseded this Article,
with the exception of the trust registration provisions. 171
Similarly, there is some overlap between the UTC and the UPC
concerning rules of construction. 172 As mentioned in Part III of this
Comment, the UPC extends to trusts certain rules of construction
applicable to wills. 173 Although a “basic policy” of the UTC is the
treatment of a revocable trust as the equivalent of a will,174 the UTC
does not provide the “exact” 175 rules of construction applicable to
trusts. 176 As the UTC’s Reporter has explained, this is in part due to the
163. UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
164. Alan Newman, The Uniform Trust Code: An Analysis of Ohio’s Version, 34 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 135, 135 (2008).
165. See UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note (This has also “led to a recognition that the trust
law in many States is thin. . . . [and] that the existing Uniform Acts relating to trusts, while
numerous, are fragmentary.”).
166. Id.
167. For example, the Drafting Committee referred to the statutes already in effect in
California, Georgia, Indiana, Texas, and Washington throughout the drafting process. See UNIF.
TRUST CODE prefatory note.
168. Id.
169. UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note; see also English, supra note 50, at 2-3.
170. UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See supra Part III.C.
174. UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note; see also Newman, supra note 2, at 568.
175. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 112 cmt.
176. UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note; see also English, supra note 131, at 162 (explaining
that although the UTC includes numerous provisions that address revocable trusts and “the Code’s
drafters concluded that the rules of construction for revocable trusts . . . ought to be the same as the
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recognition by the drafters that any attempt to draft detailed rules of
construction for trusts would be unsuccessful and would be consistent
with the laws of only a few states. 177
So instead, the rules of construction issue is addressed in a more
general, optional provision in Section 112 of the UTC. 178 Modeled after
Section 25(2) and comment e of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts,179
Section 112 of the UTC provides: “The rules of construction that apply
in this State to the interpretation of and disposition of property by will
also apply as appropriate to the interpretation of the terms of a trust and
the disposition of the trust property.” 180 A comment to Section 112
explains that because different jurisdictions take different approaches
regarding wills rules of construction, Section 112 provides that the
enacting State’s specific wills construction rules, “whatever they may
be,” will apply to the construction of trusts. 181
2. Application of Section 112
Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia have enacted
versions of the Uniform Trust Code, 182 and several of those states have

rules for wills,” the UTC does not provide a rules of construction section).
177. English, supra note 131, at 162. This is because the rules of construction by state vary
greatly. Id.; see also John D. Clark, Anti-Lapse Statute for Trusts: Finding Grantor’s Intent in
Absence of Clear Trust Language, 18 OHIO PROB. L.J. 196A (2008) (“The Uniform Trust Code, as a
series of laws for trust administration, did not need to address the many rules of trust
construction/interpretation because of the existence of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) that applies
to trusts and not simply probate matters.”).
178. A comment to Section 112 offers an alternative:
Instead of enacting this section, a jurisdiction enacting this Code may wish to enact detailed rules on the construction of trusts, either in addition to its rules on the construction
of wills or as part of one comprehensive statute applicable to both wills and trusts. For
this reason and to encourage this alternative, the section has been made optional.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 112 cmt. It appears Ohio has followed this method by, on a case-by-case
basis, enacting detailed rules on the construction of trusts in addition to the will construction rules.
See supra Part IV.C.
179. The comment to Section 112 explains that unlike the Restatement, Section 112 applies to
both revocable and irrevocable trusts. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 112 cmt.
180. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 112.
181. UNIF. TRUST CODE Article 1 General Comment.
182. The states that have enacted a version of the UTC include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Legislative Fact Sheet – Trust Code, UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trust%20Code (last visited Apr. 14,
2017).
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adopted a provision based on Section 112 of the UTC. 183 A recent case
decided by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania illustrates the
applicability of Pennsylvania’s version of Section 112 to a pretermitted
spouse statute. 184 In In re Trust under Deed of Kulig, a decedent
executed a revocable deed of trust for the benefit of the decedent and his
then-spouse. 185 Following the execution of the trust, the spouse died and
the decedent remarried. 186 The surviving spouse argued that pursuant to
Sections 2507(3) 187 and 7710.2 188 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated
Statutes, she was entitled to an intestate share of the decedent’s estate
including the principal of the trust. 189 As a question of first impression,
the court in Kulig considered the Joint State Government Commission
Comments to, and the plain and unambiguous language of, Section
7710.2. 190 The court found that the text of Section 7710.2
unambiguously applied existing wills rules of construction to the
interpretation of revocable trusts, and that the legislature intended the
pretermitted spouse rule to be applied to revocable trusts.191
3. Ohio’s Adoption of the UTC—The Ohio Trust Code
Ohio enacted a modified version of the UTC, the Ohio Trust Code

183. ALA. CODE § 19-3B-112 (through Act 2017-130 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-10112 (West, Westlaw through First Reg. Sess. of the 53rd Leg. (2017)); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 28-73-112 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Third Extraordinary Sess.); ME. STAT. tit.
18-B, § 112 (Westlaw through Ch. 3 of the 2017 First Reg. Sess. of the 128th Leg.); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 564-B:1-112 (Westlaw through Ch. 7 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
36C-1-112 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7710.2
(West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-112 (West, Westlaw through
2016 Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-112 (West, Westlaw through 2017 First Reg. Sess.); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 112 (West, Westlaw through First Sess. (2017)); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44D1-112 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
184. In re Tr. Under Deed of Kulig, 131 A.3d 494, 495 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015), appeal granted,
No. 217 MAL 2016, 2016 WL 5820602 (Pa. Oct. 4, 2016).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2507(3) (Modification by circumstances –
Marriage).
188. 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7710.2 (Rules of construction – UTC 112).
189. Kulig, 131 A.3d at 495.
190. Id. at 497, 499-501.
191. Id. at 499, 501 (“In sum, we conclude that the plain language of Section 7710.2,
consistent with the legislative comments appended thereto, reveals the intention of the Legislature
to make rules of construction consistent whether interpreting testamentary dispositions or intervivos trusts.”); but see Bell v. Estate of Bell, 2008-NMCA-045, ¶ 32-33, 143 N.M. 716, 181 P.3d
708 (holding, without referencing New Mexico’s version of Section 112 of the UTC, that a
pretermitted spouse was not entitled to a share of the decedent’s revocable trust assets).
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(OTC), which became effective January 1, 2007. 192 Generally, the OTC
codified existing trust law in Ohio, providing easily accessible answers
to many questions. 193 However, consistent with Section 112 of the UTC
being an optional provision, a comparable provision was omitted from
the OTC. 194 Because Section 112 directly conflicts with Ohio Revised
Code Section 2107.01, which defines “will” to exclude inter vivos trusts,
it would present uncertainties in Ohio law. 195 In that regard, in his article
addressing the implications of enacting the UTC in Ohio, Professor
English notes the importance of the “as appropriate” language of Section
112:
This phrase masks some very difficult questions. Not all will construction rules should necessarily be applied to trusts. Also, even those that
should apply may require modification due to the legal distinctions between wills and trusts. There is a need for a consensus on which rules
should apply, and once that issue has been determined, what they
should say. 196

Thus, even after the enactment of the Ohio Trust Code, Ohio is left
without “any comprehensive trust interpretation statute.” 197 On trust
interpretation issues for which there is not a specific statute, Ohio courts
are left relying on common law to interpret trust documents with
ambiguous or unclear language to determine how, considering the
probable intent of the settlor, to distribute the trust assets. 198
Policy considerations suggest that the General Assembly should
adopt Section 112 of the UTC as it applies to trusts. 199 Additionally,
similar issues involving the application of wills rules to trusts will
continue to arise, 200 and enactment of Section 112 would allow for
192. For an overview of the impact of the enactment of the Ohio Trust Code, see Newman,
supra note 164.
193. Id. at 136.
194. Moore, supra note 8.
195. Id. (citing Alan Newman, Report on HB 416: The Ohio Trust Code as Enacted, in OHIO
TRUST CODE 2.16 (Robert M. Brucken ed., 2006)).
196. English, supra note 50, at 12; see also English supra note 131, at 163 n.114 (explaining
why some rules of construction, such as abatement and the anti-lapse statute, would require
modification and special definitions).
197. Clark, supra note 177. However, Ohio is not in the minority. See English, supra note 131,
at 162 (“While most states have enacted numerous statutes on the construction of wills, most have
not enacted rules of construction applicable to revocable trusts and other nonprobate devices.”).
198. Clark, supra note 177 (noting that difficult problems often arise due to a
misunderstanding of the law or inattentiveness of the drafting attorney).
199. See supra Part IV.
200. The numerous problems that may arise in relation to revocable trusts include: (1) the
meaning to be given to particular words such as “heirs,” “descendants,” and “by representation”; (2)
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predictability and could help to resolve such problems before they occur.
The approach that Ohio has taken by addressing these issues on an “ad
hoc basis” may be less efficient than others, because it may require
amendment of statutes by the General Assembly each time an issue is
presented. 201 However, due to the “as appropriate” language of Section
112, it is not clear whether this Section would apply to the pretermitted
heir section even if Ohio were to adopt it. 202
Moreover, it is unlikely that Ohio would adopt Section 112.
Following the approval of the UTC in 2000, “members of the Estate
Planning, Trust, and Probate Law Section of the Ohio State Bar
Association, and members of the Legal, Legislative, and Regulatory
Committee of the Ohio Bankers League” carefully studied the UTC and
its provisions until enacting Ohio’s version in 2006. 203 Thus, because
UTC Section 112 was specifically considered and omitted from the
OTC, 204 it is unlikely the General Assembly would backtrack. A more
appropriate resolution may be for the General Assembly to, continuing
its pattern of extending wills rules of construction to trusts on a case-bycase basis, extend the pretermitted heir rule to revocable trusts.205
B.

The Ohio General Assembly Should Extend the Wills Pretermitted
Heir Statute to Trusts

Although it is not likely that an Ohio court would extend the current
Ohio pretermitted heir statute to revocable trusts, there are sound policy
reasons for the Ohio legislature to do so, as it has done with the antilapse and several other statutes. 206 The same policy reasons for
abatement; and (3) ademption. See English, supra note 50, at 11-12.
201. Layman, supra note 14. Alternatively, the General Assembly could enact one
comprehensive statute applicable to both wills and trusts. See supra note 178. However, this
approach would likely introduce problems by ignoring the differences between wills and trusts, see
English, supra note 131, at 162, and like Section 112, would present uncertainties in Ohio law, see
Alan Newman, Report on HB 416: The Ohio Trust Code as Enacted, in OHIO TRUST CODE
HANDBOOK
(2006),
at
17,
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1167&context=ua_law_publications.
202. See Layman, supra note 14.
203. Newman, supra note 164, at 135-36.
204. Newman, supra note 201, at 17.
205. See Moore, supra note 8 (“The Ohio General Assembly has been attentive to the task of
adopting construction rules applicable to wills to trusts on a case by case basis and, hopefully, this
effort will continue in the coming years.”).
206. See Angela G. Carlin, Anti-lapse statute pertaining to trusts, 1 BALDWIN’S OH. PRAC.
MERRICK-RIPPNER PROB. L. § 34:20 (2014) (explaining that because trusts are increasingly used as
will substitutes, the legislature found it appropriate to apply wills anti-lapse rules of construction to
trusts); see also Clark, supra note 140 (noting that because the trust is a common will substitute, the
anti-lapse rule of construction for wills appropriately applies to trusts).
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extending the anti-lapse statute are present when considering the
pretermitted heir statute. 207 As rules of construction, the anti-lapse and
pretermitted heir statutes aim to give effect to the intention or probable
intention of the donor. 208 Similarly, when certain events occur after the
execution of a will or donative document, some rules of construction
assume how, following such an event, a donor would have revised the
will or donative document. 209 For example, the pretermitted heir statute
assumes how a testator would have revised his or her will after the birth
or adoption of a child. 210 Moreover, the purpose of the pretermitted heir
statute is to prevent the unintentional disinheritance of a child born after
the execution of the will, and the rationale for applying this statute to
wills is equally applicable when a revocable trust is used as a will
substitute. 211
1. Issues with Current State Statutes Extending Pretermitted Heir
Statutes to Revocable Trusts
As explained in Part IV, 212 Iowa enacted a separate pretermitted
heir statute applicable to revocable trusts. Because the Iowa statutes treat
wills and trusts differently, many questions are left unanswered. 213 For
example, the statutes do not address what would happen if an afterborn
child was mentioned in a will but not mentioned in a trust instrument. 214
Similarly, the statutes do not address the ramifications of a decedent
including an intentional omission provision in the trust instrument but
not in the will. 215 Specifically, Section 633.267 provides that a child
Notably, the Estate Planning, Trust and Probate Law Section of the Ohio State Bar Association
recently proposed modifications that would allow for the procedure under Ohio’s pre-mortem
statute to apply similarly to trusts. Ralph Lehman, Wills and Trusts: Updating Ohio’s Pre-Mortem
Validation Law, 26 OHIO PROB. L.J. 191, 191-92 (2016) (arguing that this modification is necessary
due to the evolution of estate planning and the conventional use of trusts in estate plans).
207. See supra Parts III.A., IV.
208. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 cmt. a
(AM. LAW INST. 2003).
209. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 112 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
210. See McCouch, supra note 114, at 1180 (explaining that pretermitted heir statutes operate
essentially as constructional rules to determine whether a decedent’s failure to provide for a child
was intentional).
211. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
212. Supra Part IV.A.
213. Begleiter, supra note 112, at 331.
214. Id. Presumably, if the afterborn child is mentioned in a will but not in a trust instrument,
the child would also receive a share of the trust assets. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 633A.3106 (West,
Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). However, if it appears from the terms of the will that the
omission was intentional, the child would not receive a share. Id.
215. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633A.3106.
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omitted from a will receives an intestate share “unless it appears from
the will that such omission was intentional.” 216 By contrast, Section
633A.3106 provides that a child omitted from a revocable trust
instrument receives an intestate share, “unless it appears from the terms
of the trust or decedent’s will that such omission was intentional.” 217
Thus, if a decedent’s will indicates intent to omit the child, the
pretermitted child is prevented from taking from the revocable trust. 218
The approach taken by California of extending all wills rules of
constructions to trusts may also present problems. Unlike the Iowa
provisions that treat wills and trusts differently, California’s approach
ignores the difference between trusts and wills altogether.219 However,
the California statutes seem to address some of the issues that may arise
when applying the Iowa statutes. The California statute reads:
[I]f a decedent fails to provide in a testamentary instrument for a child
of decedent born or adopted after the execution of all of the decedent’s
testamentary instruments, the omitted child shall receive a share in the
decedent’s estate equal in value to that which the child would have received if the decedent had died without having executed any testamentary instrument. 220

Under the California statutes, if a child is born after the execution of all
of the decedent’s testamentary instruments (including both the will and
revocable trust instrument) and the afterborn child is provided for in a
decedent’s will but not the trust instrument, whether the child receives a
share of the trust assets will depend on the circumstances of that case.221
Under California law, in order for a decedent to effectively disinherit an
afterborn child, the decedent’s intention to disinherit the child must
appear on the face of the instrument that “at the time of its execution, the
decedent had the child in mind and knowledgeably and intentionally
omitted to provide for the child.” 222 Thus, if the decedent made clear in

216. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.267 (Children born or adopted after execution of will).
217. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633A.3106 (Children born or adopted after execution of a revocable
trust) (emphasis added).
218. Begleiter, supra note 112, at 331.
219. English, supra note 50, at 12.
220. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21620 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 4 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.).
221. For example, the omitted child would not receive a share of the decedent’s estate if: (1)
the decedent’s intention to disinherit the child appears in the testamentary instruments; or (2) the
decedent had one or more children and devised substantially all the estate to the omitted child’s
other parent; or (3) the decedent provided for the child by transfer outside of the testamentary
instruments. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21621.
222. Edith C. Schaffer, 1 CAL. TRANSACTIONS FORMS—EST. PLANNING Omitted Child
Statutes § 6:31, Westlaw (database updated June 2015) (citing In re Torregano’s Estate, 352 P.2d
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the trust instrument that the omission of the child was intentional, the
omitted child would not be entitled to a portion of the trust assets. 223
Additionally, when a decedent includes an intentional omission
provision in the trust but not in the will, the child would receive a share
of the decedent’s estate equal in value to what the child would have
received had the decedent died without having executed any
testamentary instrument. 224
2. Consideration of these Issues Will Provide for a More Careful
and Effective Drafting of Ohio’s Statute
For several reasons, if the General Assembly were to extend Ohio’s
pretermitted heir statute to revocable trusts, amending the current wills
pretermitted heir statute to include revocable trusts would be preferable
to enacting a separate statute that applies only to revocable trusts. First,
revocable trusts are functionally equivalent to wills and both are often
used by decedents in comprehensive estate plans. 225 Thus, treating wills
and revocable trusts separately in this context would likely present more
issues than providing one statute that applies to both wills and trusts.
Similarly, it will be simpler to give effect to the presumed intent of the
decedent to provide for an inadvertently-omitted child by including rules
applicable to both wills and trusts within one statute.
Next, in order to draft a statute that effectively provides for an
afterborn child omitted from a revocable trust instrument, it must be
determined under what circumstances a pretermitted child should take.
Ohio’s wills pretermitted heir statute applies in instances where: (1)
505 (Cal. 1960); Smith v. Crook, 206 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)) (“To effectively
omit a child, the disinheritance provision in a testamentary instrument must either specifically
mention the child . . . to be omitted, or must contain language clearly evidencing the decedent’s
intention, at the time of executing the instrument, to omit the child . . . from sharing in the estate.”);
see also Derek P. Cole, Chapter 724: The California Bar Association’s 1997 Omnibus Probate Law
Amendments, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 397, 401 (1998) (“To the extent a person chooses not to
provide for a child or spouse they will have to make this explicit in their trust instrument. There will
be no uncertainties as to whom the trustor intended to provide for and whether the omission of a
certain child or spouse was accidental.”) (footnotes omitted).
223. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21621.
224. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21620 Section 21621(a) provides: “The decedent’s failure to provide
for the child in the decedent’s testamentary instruments was intentional and that intention appears
from the testamentary instruments.” CAL. PROB. CODE § 21621(a). It seems this provision could be
construed to mean that if there were an intentional omission provision in either the decedent’s trust
instrument or the will (but not both), the afterborn child would not receive a share of the estate.
225. See Newman, supra note 2, at 524; English supra note 131, at 187 n.189 (“[T]he
revocable trust is normally used in conjunction with a pourover will. The use of a pourover will
assures that property not transferred to the trust during life will, at death, be combined and
distributed with the property the settlor managed to convey.”).
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“after making a will, a testator has a child born alive, adopts a child, or
designates an heir . . . , or if a child or designated heir who is absent and
reported to be dead proves to be alive;” (2) the child has not been
provided for in the will or by settlement; (3) it does not appear by the
will that the testator intended to disinherit the pretermitted child or heir;
and (4) the entire estate is not devised to the surviving spouse. 226
Presumably, the same circumstances that invoke the wills pretermitted
heir statute would be applicable to omissions of an afterborn child from
a trust instrument.
The General Assembly should also consider instances when a
decedent may implement both a will and a revocable trust in his or her
comprehensive dispositive plan and address the potential problems that
are made apparent by the other states’ pretermitted heir statutes. 227 Thus,
the statute should specify what happens when a decedent provides for a
pretermitted child in a will but not a trust instrument, or conversely,
when the decedent provides for the child in a trust instrument but not a
will. 228 One approach the General Assembly could take is providing that
an afterborn child receives an intestate share of the estate, including the
revocable trust assets, “unless it appears by either the will or revocable
trust instrument that it was the intention of the testator to disinherit the
pretermitted child or heir.” 229 Thus, any intention in either the will or
trust to disinherit the child will apply to both instruments. Alternatively,
the General Assembly could, like California, require the decedent to
indicate the intent to disinherit in each testamentary instrument or
otherwise the child will take an intestate share. 230
Similarly, it should be determined whether the child must be born
after the execution of both the will and the revocable trust instrument in
order to be considered pretermitted, and what effect it has, if any, if the
will and the trust instrument were executed at the same time. 231 Because
under Section 2107.34 the child must be born or adopted after the
execution of the will in order to receive a share, a comparable provision
that requires a child to be born after the execution of both the will and
226. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.34 (West, Westlaw through File 2 of the 132nd GA (20172018)).
227. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 21620-21621 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 4 of the 2017 Reg.
Sess.); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 633.267, 633A.3106 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
228. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 21620-21621; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 633.267, 633A.3106.
229. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.34.
230. Id.
231. For example, if the will and the trust instrument were executed at the same time and the
decedent provides for an afterborn child in the will but not the trust instrument, presumably that
would demonstrate the decedent’s intent not to provide for the child in the trust instrument.
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the trust instrument would allow for easier administration of the rule.232
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ohio General Assembly should amend the pretermitted heir
statute to allow an afterborn child to receive a share of their deceased
parent’s property, regardless of whether the child was inadvertently
omitted from a will or revocable trust instrument. Although, in general,
state legislatures have been slow to respond to the increase in the use of
revocable trusts as will substitutes, persuasive authority supports the
extension of this rule to revocable trusts. Moreover, the Ohio legislature
has responded to similar issues that arise in relation to revocable trusts
on a case-by-case basis and should do so here. By amending the statute,
a decedent’s presumed intent will be given effect regardless of whether
the decedent chooses to use a will, a revocable trust, or both, to dispose
of his property at his death. Similarly, in the context of the hypothetical
in the Introduction to this Comment, amendment of the statute will allow
for equal treatment under Ohio law of child B, who was unintentionally
omitted from Settlor’s revocable trust instrument, and child A, who was
inadvertently omitted from Testator’s will.

232. Instead, having to establish a timeline including the date of the execution of the will and
the trust instrument, if the will and the trust instrument were executed at different times, and the
birth date of a child would be more burdensome than enforcing a rule like that enacted by the
California legislature. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21620.
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